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Abstract 
Completeness is shown for several versions of Girard’s linear logic with respect to Petri nets 
as the class of models. One logic considered is the @-free fragment of intuitionistic linear logic 
without the exponential !. For this fragment Petri nets form a sound and complete model. The 
strongest logic considered is intuitionistic linear logic, with @, *, &, @ and the exponential ! 
(“of course”), and forms of quantification. This logic is shown sound and complete with respect 
to atomic nets (these include nets in which every transition leads to a nonempty multiset of 
places), though only once we add extra axioms specific to the Petri-net model. The logic is 
remarkably expressive, enabling descriptions of the kinds of properties one might wish to show 
of nets; in particular, negative properties, asserting the impossibility of an assertion, can also be 
expressed. Unfortunately, with respect to this logic, whether an assertion is true of a finite net 
becomes undecidable. 
1. Introduction 
In [3] it was shown how Petri nets can naturally be made into models of Girard’s 
intuitionistic linear logic in such a way that many properties one might wish to state 
of nets become expressible in linear logic. We refer the reader to [3, 41 for more 
background and a discussion of other works. Those papers left open the questions of 
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completeness for the logic with respect to nets as a model. This paper addresses such 
questions. 
In fact we examine several fragments of intuitionistic linear logic with respect to the 
model of [3]. It is explained in this paper again in Section 4. 
One feature is that of the @-free fragment of intuitionistic linear logic without the 
exponential !. For this fragment, Petri nets form a sound and complete model. Another 
simple fragment is obtained by dropping linear implication --o instead. For this d- 
free logic an extra axiom, of distributivity of & over CB, is inherited from the Petri 
model and is necessary for a completeness result. The results, for modest fragments of 
intuitionistic linear logic, are presented in Section 6. 
Our strongest completeness result is for the full logic described in [6, 91, viz., it 
includes 
8, -3 CD, &, and ! 
though at a cost, to the purity of the linear logic, of adding quantification over markings 
and axioms special to the net semantics. For this strongest completeness result, a slight 
restriction is also made to the Petri nets considered as models; they should be atomic 
(see Definition 22), but fortunately this restriction is one generally met, and even often 
enforced, in working with Petri nets. The step of considering only atomic nets as 
models has two important pay-offs: one is that the exponential !A becomes definable 
as A & 1, where 1 is the unit of 8; the other is that we can say internally, within 
the logic, that an assertion is not satisfied - the possibility of asserting such negative 
properties boosts the logic’s expressive power considerably. Unfortunately, as is shown, 
we pay for the great expressive power through the theory of a finite net becoming non- 
recursive. 
There have been two aims in this work. One is to understand linear logic through 
the familiar model of Petri nets, the other to explore the role that linear logic might 
have as a specification logic for Petri nets. From the point of view of the two aims, 
our results are a mixture of successes and disappointments, and we offer an evaluation, 
with leads for future work. in the conclusion. 
2. Linear intuitionistic logic 
The connectives of linear intuitionistic logic are 
8 tensor, with unit 1, called one, 
& conjunction, with unit T, called true, 
@ disjunction, with unit F, called false. 
We take as the definition of linear intuitionistic logic the proof rules presented in 
[6, 91: 
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Structural rules 
m (identity) 
Logical rules 
We use r as an abbreviation for a (possibly empty) sequence Al,. . . , A,, of assump- 
tion formulae. 
The absence of the rules for thinning and contraction is compensated, to some extent, 
by the addition of the logical operator “of course”. In [6, 91 this operator is presented 
with the following proof rules (stronger than those in [5]): 
“Of course” rules 
!A t- A !A t 1 !A k !A @ !A (1) 
B k !A (2) 
Given a proposition A, the assertion of !A has the possibility of being instantiated 
by the proposition A, the unit 1 or !A ~3 !A, and thus of arbitrarily many assertions 
of !A. 
3. Quantale interpretation 
As recognised by several people [l, 13-151, quantales 2 provide an algebraic seman- 
tics for linear intuitionistic logic. Quantales are to linear intuitionistic logic as complete 
2 As originally defined, quantales need not be commutative and should satisfy the idempotency law q@q=q. 
We shall take quantales to be commutative and relax the idempotency law. 
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Heyting algebras are to intuitionistic logic, A quantale is a commutative monoid on a 
complete join semilattice. Spelled out: 
Definition 1. A quantale 2 is a complete join semilattice (i.e. a partial order with an 
operation forming joins of arbitrary sets) together with an associative, commutative, 
binary operation 63 and constant 1 such that 
q@l=q, q@v~=V{q@pIpEP}. 
Entailment is interpreted as the order relation, 6, on the underlying lattice of a 
quantale. The logical operation, 8, is interpreted by the corresponding binary operation 
in the quantale and the logical constant 1 is interpreted as 1 in the quantale. The 
disjunction, 83, of linear logic is understood as binary join and the conjunction, &, 
as binary meet. The logical constants T and F are interpreted as the top and bottom 
element, respectively, of the complete lattice. Linear implication is a derived operation 
with respect to a quantale. The definition is analogous to that of implication on a 
complete Heyting algebra, but this time w.r.t. $3 in place of A. The definition of linear 
implication ensures the adjunction 
rBp6q 8 r<p-oq 
With respect to a quantale, and interpretations of the atomic propositions as elements 
of a quantale, we can inductively associate a proposition A in linear logic with its 
denotation as a quantale element [A]. An entailment 
Al,...+& t= A 
holds in the quantale iff 
The special case where n = 0 is allowed, in which case the situation amounts to 
+ A iff l<i[Alj. 
It is a routine matter to check that each rule is sound with respect to this interpretation. 
For example, the right and left introduction rules for disjunction, CD, and conjunction, 
&, express that they are the join and meet with respect to entailment. In this way it 
can be seen that, with respect to a quantale: 
Theorem 2. If t- A then k A. 
We have so far ignored the treatment of !A. The rules of (1) for !A are interderivable 
with the following single rule: 
!Ak ~&A&(!A@!A) 
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So, as an interpretation of !q, for an element q of a quantale, we require an element 
x such that 
x d l&q&(x@x). (3) 
This will not in general characterize a unique value of the quantale; for instance, taking 
x to be the bottom element of the lattice will always do. However, from (2) it follows 
that any n satisfying (3) should be below !q, and hence !q should be the greatest 
postfixed point, and so the fixed point of 
x++l&q&(x@x) 
in the complete lattice given together with the quantale. Such a solution ensures the 
soundness of the proof rules extended by those for !A. 
4. Petri nets 
Petri net is a model of processes (or systems) in terms of types of resources, repre- 
sented by places which can hold to arbitrary nonnegative multiplicity, and how those 
resources are consumed or produced by actions, represented by transitions. They are 
described using the notation of multisets. 
A multiset over a set P is a function, M : P - N. We shall henceforth only 
be concerned with finite multisets, i.e. {a E P 1 M(a) # 0) finite. With addition, +, of 
multisets defined by (M +M’)(a) = M(a) + M’(a) for all a E P, multisets over P form 
a (free) commutative monoid with 0 (Va E P. Q(a) = 0), the empty multiset, as unit. 
We take a Petri net N to consist of (P, T,‘(-), (-)‘), where P, a set of places, and 
T, a set of transitions, are accompanied by maps ‘(-), (-)’ on transitions T which for 
each t E T give a multiset of P, called the pre- and post (multi)set of t, respectively. 
For the moment, there are none of the usual restrictions on the net, such as absence of 
isolated elements, and in particular transitions with empty presets and/or postsets will 
be allowed. Furthermore, we are actually considering nets with unconstrained capacity. 
A Peti net possesses a notion of state, intuitively corresponding to a finite distri- 
bution of resources, formalized in the definition of a marking. A marking of N will 
simply be a finite multiset over P. We use ~4? to denote the set of markings of the 
net, understood from the context. Sometimes nets are associated with an initial marking 
n/r,. The behaviour of a net is expressed by saying how markings change as transitions 
occur (or fire). For markings, M,M’, and a transition t E T, M[t)M’ stands for t fires 
from M to M’; i.e. the firing relation [t) is given by 
M[t)M’ iff 3M”~Jl;e. M =M” + l t and t’ +M” =M’. 
So t is enabled at A4 if there is an M’ E k! such that M [t) M’. We shall write M -+ M’ 
for the reachability relation, the reflexive and transitive closure of the firing relations. 
We shall use l(M) to denote the set of markings which can reach M. We will generally 
call this set the downwards closure of M. It is defined by J(M)== {M’ E ~4 1 M’ + M}. 
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Petri nets can be presented by using the well-known graphical notation, which we 
will use in an example. Places are represented by circles, transitions as squares, and 
arcs of appropriate multiplicities used to indicate the pre and post sets. The formal 
definitions can then be brought to life in the so-called “token game” where markings 
are visualized as consisting of a distribution of tokens over places; the number of 
tokens residing on a place expresses the multiplicity to which it holds according to the 
marking. The tokens are consumed and produced as transitions occur. A basic reference 
for Petri nets is [12]. 
5. Petri-net interpretation 
For simplicity, we consider a linear logic language where the atomic propositions 
are places of nets, i.e. formulae are given by 
A ::= TlFll constants 
Ia atoms 
1 A ~3 A I A -O A multiplicative connectives 
IA&AIA@A additive connectives 
1 !A exponential connective 
We make the choice of interpreting an atomic proposition as the downwards closure 
of the associated place, but we could just as well have used the downwards closure of 
some marking without altering our results. This choice is consistent with the following 
intuitive understanding: the denotation of an assertion is to be thought of as the set 
of requirements sufficient to establish it. This reading will be discussed further shortly, 
after presenting the semantics. More abstractly, we are giving a semantics in a quantale 
9 consisting of downwards-closed subsets of markings with respect to reachability, 
ordered by inclusion, with a binary operation given by 
With respect to a net N, linear logic formulae are interpreted as follows. The denotation 
of an assertion can be thought of as consisting of the set of markings which satisfy it. 
[TIN =A 
IFIN =0 
lIlllN ={MlM+Q} 
lIalN ={MlM+a} 
IA 8 Bh = {M I ~MA E [A~MB E [B&v. M + MA + MB} 
[A - BIN = {M I VA& E [Ah. A4 + MA E [B&q} 
[A & Bh = [Ah n [B&v 
[A CE BIN = I[Abv U iBbv 
[!A&v = u{q I q a postfixed point of x H 1 fl I[AIN f~ (n ~3 x)} 
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The final clause gives the denotation of !A as a maximum fixed point. The above 
definitions correspond to the quantale semantics which is determined once we fix the 
interpretation of atoms (see [3]). 
Because of the interpretation of 1, validity of an assertion A for the given net, N, 
is defined by 
~==NA iff CJEUADN. 
Semantic entailment between assertions A and B is given by 
Because of the interpretation of linear implication, this is equivalent to 
For T=A l,...,A, denote Al @... @A, by @V. We write r FN B for @r FN B. 
General validity, k A, of an assertion A is defined by 
k A iff +N A for every net N 
and with respect to entailment, r 1 B iff r kv B for every net N. 
As a special case that quantale semantics is sound, we have the soundness result: 
Theorem 3. Zf r t- A then r t= A. 
So we see that with respect to a Petri net, an assertion A is denoted by a set of 
markings [AIN. As we have discussed, a marking of net can be viewed as a distribution 
of resources. When M E I[A]N we can think of the marking M as a distribution of 
resources sufficient to establish A according to the net; in this sense the marking M 
is one of the (in general many) requirements sufficient to establish A. The meaning of 
an assertion A is specified by saying what requirements are sufficient to establish it - 
this is the content of the denotation I[A]IN. Accordingly, a net satisfies an assertion A 
when 0 E I[AIN, expressing that A can be established with no resources. 
This reading squares with the fact that assertions denote subsets of markings which 
are downwards closed with respect to the reachability relation of the net; if M E [AIN, 
so M is a requirement sufficient to establish A, and M’ + M so we can obtain M for 
M’, then so also is M’ a sufficient requirement of A. Casting an eye over the definition 
of the semantics of assertions we can read, for example, the definition of [a]~, for an 
atom a, as expressing that a sufficient requirement of a is any marking from which 
the (singleton) marking a can be reached according to the net. Similarly, the sufficient 
requirements of A &B are precisely those which are sufficient requirements of both A 
and of B. An element of [A - BIN can be seen as what is required, in addition to 
any requirement of A, in order to establish B. There are similar restatements of the 
semantics for the other connectives as well. 
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This understanding should be borne in mind when considering the examples that 
follow, where we make use of the fact that 8, & and 6~ are associative and assume 
the following precedence: - < &, $ < @. 
Examples. Consider the net 
a 
Here we have [!I~N, = {d,&,b},.. . , Bcl~, ={a,~} and ib@ch, ={d+a,d+c,a+s 
t c,b + g,b + c}, so consequently 
[d 8 a]~, 2 I[b 8 C]N, or equivalently +N, d @ a 4 b 63 c 
+N, a@a - b@c 
The most difficult connective to comprehend is probably linear implication so we give 
a few more examples here. For the nets 
A$= b d and 
iv3 = b e 
we have 
Ic - dINI = 0 and I=N tc - 4-F 
[b 4 d]N, = {a) and /=N* (b 4 d) -a 
Tla - eh, = {b-t d}. 
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A more peculiar example of linear implication is given by the following net N: 
Notation. For a multiset M of assertions of our logic, we associate the formula k 
which when A4 is nonempty is given by 
n 
@ &f(A) whereA’= andA”=-, forn>O 
MU )+a 
and otherwise, when M=Q, is given by the formula 1. We shall not bother to distinguish 
A4 and2 except for a few crucial statements and proofs. 
We can then express that one marking is reachable in a net N: 
Proposition 4. For any multisets of atoms M and M’, 
M + M’ in the net N lx E=N M --o M’. 
Proof. Simply note that M + M’ in N iff _lM G LM’ iff I[MBN C I[M’IN iff +N M -O 
M’. 0 
Before reading the list of sample properties below observe 
I[M @ TIN = J{M’ 1 M’ 2 M}. 
5.1. Sample properties 
Suppose a net N with initial marking Ma. 
From the initial marking it is possible to reach a marking where a is marked: k~ 
MO 4 a@T. 
From the initial marking it is possible to reach a marking where a place, a, of 
S zfin P is marked: FN MO - (BOEs a) ~3 T. 
Once a is marked it is possible to reach a marking where b is marked: FN a @T - 
b @ T. 
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l Once a is marked either b or c can become marked (but we do not know which): 
+,,ra@T - (b@c)@T. 
l Once a is marked both b and c can become marked (but not necessarily simultane- 
ously): kN a c% T --o (b&c) @T. 
Example 5 (Mutual exclusion). Consider the net N: 
where the marking of the place wt indicates that the first process p1 is working outside 
its critical region cl and similarly for the other process ~2. The resource corresponding 
to b is used to ensure mutual exclusion of the critical regions and after a process has 
been in its critical region it returns a resource a which is then prepared (transformed 
into b) for the next turn. The initial marking Me will be MO = b @I wI @ w2. We 
can now express that e.g. p1 can enter its critical region (from the initial marking) 
by FN Ma -J ct @ T. However, this does not ensure that no undesired tokens are 
present, so it is better to express it: FN Ma - cl @ ~2. If the system is in a “working 
state” then both processes have the possibility of entering their critical section: by 
wt @(a@b)@wz --o cl @WZ&W~@ZZ. The property, that when p1 is in its critical section 
and p2 is working it is possible that p2 can later come into its critical section with p1 
working, is expressed by FN cl @ w2 - wt @ ~2. Similar other “positive” properties 
can be expressed. Shortly, we shall see how to express the “negative” property that 
both processes cannot be in their critical regions at the same time. 
6. Elementary completeness results 
In this section we shall be concerned with completeness results for different fragments 
of linear logic without exponentials. 
We start by sketching the completeness proof for quantale semantics. 
The idea in showing completeness is to build a quantale by taking the ideal comple- 
tion of the Lindenbaum algebra. More precisely, take Q to be G-ordered set of subsets 
I of assertions of linear logic, without exponentials, such that 
AFBEI+AEI, 
x~r~ex~r 
(We understand @ 0 = F). 
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The @operation on ideals is got by taking 
z@J=&f{CI3AEz, BEJ.Cl-ABB}. 
That this yields an ideal follows routinely: clearly Z @ J is closed with respect to 
entailment, i.e. B k C EZ 63 J implies B EZ 18 J; it is closed under $ because it 
contains @ 0=F and if C,C’EZ@J then CFAOB and C’t-A’@B’, forA,A’EZ, 
B,B’ E J, whence 
C$C’ t- (A@B)@(A’@B’) 
t- (A~B)$(A’~B)~(A~B’)~(A’~B’) 
k (A@A’)@(B@B’), 
where (A @A’) E Z and (B @ B’) E J thus ensuring C @ C’ E Z 8 J - thus it is closed 
under ED. 
The quantale Q interprets assertions once we decide to interpret atoms a in the 
following way: 
It is a relatively simple matter to show the following agreement between the semantics 
in the constructed quantale and the proof system: 
Lemma 6. Letting A be an assertion of linear logic without exponentials, 
IIAIQ = {B 1 B I- A}. 
Proof. By structural induction. We consider two cases 
A E Al @AZ: The denotation I[Al @A& = [AI]Q V iA&, the join in Q, which 
contains Al @AZ, and hence must equal the principal ideal {B 1 B I- Al $ AZ}. 
A-Al 4 AZ: By definition, 
a join in Q which contains Al -O A2 and hence includes the principal ideal 
{B I B I- Al 4A2). It is in fact equal to this principal ideal. To see this, let B E Z where 
Z @ [Al%p 2 [A~]Q. Then B@Al E I[AzIQ, so by structural induction B@A1 k AZ, whence 
BtAl+A2. 0 
Corollary 7. Let A be an assertion of linear logic without exponentials. Then 
As a corollary we from A k B ifF F A - B obtain completeness with respect to 
quantales: 
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Theorem 8. For the fragment without exponentials we have: 
In the remaining sections we shall only be concerned with completeness proofs for 
the net semantics. 
6.1. Completeness for the @-free fragment 
Restrict the syntax to the fragment: 
A :: = T 11 I a 1 A1 &A2 1 Al @ A2 1 Al - A2 (@-free) 
where a ranges over atoms. For the @-free fragment we construct a net N where the 
places are formulae and the transitions essentially correspond to the provable sequents, 
i.e. 
l Places are assertions of (e-free) above. An atom will be interpreted as its singleton 
marking. 
l Transitions are pairs (M,M’) of multisets of places for which2 l-16? with pre- and 
postset maps l (M,M’) = A4 and (M,M’)’ = M’. 
For instance, the net has the following transition: 
because A @ (A * B) I- B. 
Lemma 9. For markings M, M’ of the net N, 
M + M’ in the net lr k t-k’. 
Proof. if: It is clear by definition that if 2 t- I$ then M + M’ for any markings 
M,M’ E .dZ. 
only iJ Follows by a simple inductive argument once we have established 
M [t) M’ implies d t-6’. 
However, if M [t)M’ then, by definition, there is some M” E 4 such that 
M=M”+‘t and t’+M”=M’. 
From c E p we derive&” &I q k p @&“. The result then follows frornk -iEk” @ q 
and&’ -IF p @$“. 0 
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Lemma 10. For the @-free fragment we have: !A~N = {M g i-A}. 
Proof. By induction on the structure of A using the previous lemma. 
A E T: iiTBN = J%? = (44 E & 1 M F T} by axiom r t- T (recall & consists of finite 
multisets). 
A=l: ~~~N={ME~;I(M--~~}={ME~~(M~~=~) byLemma9. 
A=a: ilal~=={ME~~M -+a}={MEdIMka} by Lemma 9. 
A G Al @Az: 
ME[AI @&]IN H 3A41 E~[A~I,IJ,M~ E I[AzIN.M -+A41 +A42 by definition, 
e 3Mt,M2 E JZ.Mt I- At,M2 k A2 and A4 -+ Mt +n/iz 
by induction, 
M A4 E Al @ A2 by (t-63), (W) and (identity). 
M EI[A, 4 AZ&V H VMl E[AIIN.M +MI E ~Az]N by definition 
H VA4t E&‘.M~ k A1 +Mc3M~ I- A:! by induction 
+ M t Al --o A:! by (k-) and (identity). 
To see “+” suppose M k Al --o AZ. From (-I-) we derive MA1 I- AZ. Using (cut) 
and AIt k Al we then get M,Mt t AZ. 
A = Al &A2: 
MEI[AI &A21~ H MEI[AIIN and ME~A~]IN by definition 
u M k AI and M t- A2 by induction 
* ~4 k Al &A2 by Q-&l. 
For the other direction “-+” we by (identity) and (Z&t) obtain Al & A2 t AI and so 
A4 k Al from M t-Al &A2 and (cut). By symmetry A4 t AZ. 0 
Because +N A follows from k A, and the fragment contains implication we deduce: 
Theorem 11. For the @-free fragment we have 
As observed by Sergei Soloviev, for a particular sequent, the net N need only be 
constructed with the finite number of places corresponding to subformulae involved in 
the sequent. The net may still be infinite by having an infinite number of transitions - 
it is not clear that the net can be made finite if the sequent contains & or -. 
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6.2. Completeness for the -o-free fragment 
We can obtain completeness for the +-free fragment of propositional intuitionistic 
logic. Its syntax 
A ::=TIFI~I~IA~~AzIA~&A~(A,~AAz (+-free) 
where a ranges over atoms. With a similar construction to that in the previous section 
we can define a net N (this time with places in the +-free fragment) to obtain a rather 
weak form of completeness for the *-free fragment. 
Lemma 12. For the d-free fragment we have ~IA~N C{M IM k A}. 
Proof. Induction on the structure of A. All the cases except A E F and A E Al @AZ 
are handled exactly as the G-part of Lemma 10 (notice the weaker hypothesis). 
A E F: Evident as [FIN = 0. 
A=Al@A2: 
ME [Al @ A21~ ti ME IIA1l~ or A4 E iA& by definition, 
+ A4 l- A, or M t A2 by induction, 
+ M I- A, $ A2 by (l-@Z) or (Mr). •1 
As a corollary we have: 
Theorem 13. For the -o-free fragment we have 
We have not used the distributive law yielded by the net semantics: 
(&- @ -dist.) 
With this as an additional proof rule we can obtain a stronger completeness result for 
the +-free fragment of propositional intuitionistic logic. 
To show completeness we construct a net with places (and markings) identified with 
assertions in the @-free subfragment 
A ::=TIlIaIA1&A2IA1@A2 (d-B-free) 
We will just call it the @free fragment in the rest of this section. Construct a net N 
where: 
l Places are assertions in the @-free fragment (atoms are to be interpreted as their 
singleton markings). 
l Transitions are pairs (M,M’) of multisets of places for which$ t-G’. 
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Lemma 14. For markings M,M’ of the net, 
M + M’ in the net iff M,M’@-free and M t- M’ in the logic. 
Proof. The proof is like that for Lemma 9. 0 
Lemma 15 (Decomposition lemma). For any -=-free assertion A there is aJinite set I 
indexing -o-@-free assertions M,, such that 
Proof. The proof proceeds by structural induction on the assertion A. The base cases 
are routine; for example F -I!- @0 (=F by definition), i.e. falsity is interderivable with 
the empty disjunction. Of the remaining cases, those where A has the form Al &AZ 
makes use, as is to be expected, of the additional distributivity rules for & and @. 
Inductively, assume 
Then, from these assumptions and repeated use of &-@-distributivity 
Al &A2 --it- @jM,‘) & EB,M;) 
+ @,(M,’ & (@,M;Z) 
The case where A has the form Al @AZ is exactly analogous, making use instead of 
the standard @@-distributivity of linear logic. 0 
Lemma 16. Let r = B 1,. . . , B,,, possibly empty, be list of assumptions in the @-free 
fragment above. Then, 
and 
ifrEC@D then TFC or rtD. 
Proof. By cut-elimination any proof of a sequent can be replaced by a cut-free proof. 
The above lemma follows by induction or the size of cut-free proofs. 0 
Lemma 17. For any +-free assertion A, 
[AIN = {M IM is @-free, M I- A}. 
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Proof. The proof proceeds by structural induction on the assertion A. 
A E T : Clearly, liTlI,+~ = &if = {M 1 M @-free} = {M @-free 1 M k T}. 
A= F: Now, using Lemma 16, I[ FIN = 0 = (MIA4 @-free, M k F}. 
Azl: [l]N={MIM + Q} = (A4 (A4 @-free,M k 1) by Lemma 14. 
A--a: [&={MlM -+ a} = {M IM $-fiee,M k u} by Lemma 14. 
A E A, & A2 : We argue straightforwardly that 
M E[AI &Az]IN H ME~AI]IN and M E [AzBN by definition, 
H M @-free,M I- Al and M !- AZ by induction, 
& M @free,M k Al & A2 by the proof rules. 
A c Al @AZ: Argue 
ME I[Al @ Az]IN ++ M E I[AI~N or M E [A& by definition, 
++ M @-free and either M k Al or M k A2 
by induction, 
u M @-free,M k Al CB A2 by Lemma 16 and (t@). 
A E Al @AZ: The proof in this case is a little more involved. Argue: 
M l IA, 6x1 A& + 3Ml E I[A,b,Mz EUAI[ON. M --) MI +M2 
by definition, 
H M @-free, 3Ml,M2 @-free. MI t- Al, Mz t- A2 and 
M k MI 18 M2 by induction and Lemma 14, 
+ M @-free,M t- Al @ A2 from the proof rules. 
To show the converse implication, and so equivalence, assume M 
Al @AZ. By Lemma 15, we may assume 
Al -It- @M,’ and A2 -k $M;. 
iEI jEJ 
We may furthermore assume I and J to be nonempty. Otherwise 
so, as M is @-free, M y Al @ A2 by Lemma 16 - a contradiction. 
Therefore 
is @-free and M t- 
Al @A2 -II- F and 
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so by distributivity, 
Mk @ M,L@M,?. 
(i, j)El xJ 
Hence, by Lemma 16, 
M t-M: @Mf for some iEZ, _iCJ 
such that M) I- Al and M,? t AZ. This plainly gives the required converse. 0 
Corollary 18. F,v A iff k A, for any +-free assertion A. 
Thus we have completeness. 
Because we only use the decomposition lemma (Lemma 15) for the @I case of the 
structural induction in Lemma 17, we also get completeness for the larger fragment of 
assertions B given by 
where A lies in the d-free fragment and a, as usual, ranges over atoms. 
Lemma 19. For the larger fragment, 
IBIN = {M IM @-free, M k B}. 
Proof. The proof proceeds by structural induction, as in Lemma 17, but for a new case 
where the assertion has the form A 4 B. Because of its assumed form, by Lemma 15, 
there is a decomposition 
A it- @Ml. 
rEi 
Now, for @-free M we argue that 
M E!A 4 BIN * VMA E~A&v. M +MA E IBIN by definition, 
@ VMA $-free. MA k A + M @CJ MA t- B by induction, 
w VMA @-free. MA t @igfMi + M @MA k B 
ej VMA @-fiee.(3iEZ.M~kMz)+M@M~kB 
by Lemma 16 
@ ViEZ,VMA @-free. Ma I-Mi +-M@MA t-B 
H WEI. M@ M, tB. 
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Here “s-” follows directly by taking MA = M,. The converse “+” makes use of the 
fact that if MA F A!, and M@M, t B then M@MA F B. Now, continuing the argument, 
ME[A+B]~ w WEI.M@A~~~B 
H @,&4 @ Mi) k B from the proof system, 
Corollary 20. For the larger fragment, k B 13 t- B with the additional &-CD- 
distributivity law. 
Theorem 21. For the +-free fragment, 
TkA zJ- l-‘kA 
with the additional &-@-distributive law. 
Proof. Corollary 20 gives 
k6W-A iff t @l--A. 
Hence 
TkA iff rkA. 0 
7. Quantification and atomic nets 
The strongest logic we consider is intuitionistic linear logic, with @, 4, &, @ and the 
exponential ! (“of course”), and forms of quantification. We will show its completeness 
with respect to atomic nets. 
Definition 22. A net is atomic iff whenever M + 0 then Q --+ M, for any marking M. 
This corresponds to 1 being atomic in the associated quantale. A sufficient condition 
for a net to be atomic is that every transition of it leads to a nonempty multiset of 
markings. 
Notice that A & 1 plays the role of the exponential !A, and indeed according the net 
semantics, when the net N is atomic 
l!Ah =I[A&lliv. 
An other interesting consequence of dealing with an atomic net N is that we can now 
express negative properties. Precisely: 
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Proposition 23. For an atomic net N and a closed formula A, 
+,x,A&~-JF &j- ~NA. 
Proof. Notice that due to atomicity, the denotation of A&l is that of 1 if the denotation 
of A contains 1 and empty otherwise. Hence the denotation of A & 1 4 F equals that 
of T in case k,v A and that of F in case +,v A. 0 
Abbreviating A & 1 - F by “A, and combining Proposition 23 with Proposition 4 
we can express that a marking M’ cannot be reached from another M: 
Corollary 24. For markings M and M’, 
M ftM’ zr k/q “(M 4 M’). 
Example 5 (continued). We can now express that the processes, pi and p2 cannot 
get into their critical regions at the same time. We might try kN “(MO -O cl @ c2). 
This is not quite right however, since by “(MO --o cl 8 ~2) merely states that the two 
processes cannot be in their critical regions at the same time when no other tokens are 
present; the correct statement is FN “(Ma --o cl 8 c2 @T). 
7.1. Sample properties 
Suppose a net N. 
l There is a marking with a marked such that b will never be marked in any reachable 
marking: 
+N “(a@T - b@T). 
a For any marking obtained from M the load on the place a cannot exceed n E R.J, i.e. 
with M = MO this means that a is n-safe: 
k~ -(M - a”+’ @T). 
l That a transition t is M-dead in a net N, i.e. VM’ E [M). M’[{), is expressed by 
+=N =‘(M ---o ‘t @ T). 
l If N only has finitely many places, we can express safeness, i.e. VM E 
[MO) Va E P. M(a) < 1 (N is l-safe): 
by “(MO - (=%@a) @T). 
7.2. Syntax 
Assume a countable set of atoms. Define the assertions over the atoms to be 
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where a ranges over the atoms and x ranges over countably many variables. The 
new constructions @, A and &A are forms of existential and universal quantification 
and bind accordingly. We adopt the traditional notions of free and bound variable 
and in particular use FV(A) for the set of free variables in A, and more generally 
FV(A I ,...,A,) for FV(Ai) U ... U FV(A,). The variables x are to be thought of as 
standing for markings of a net. 
7.3. Semantics 
Given a net N, with markings (i.e. finite multisets of places) JZ, a (marking) envi- 
ronment is a function p from variables to markings JZ. Because of the presence of free 
variables we define the meaning of an assertion with respect to a marking environment. 
In particular, 
Atoms are interpreted as singletons of places of the net as in Section 5 and similarly 
validity of a closed assertion A for the given net, N, can be expressed by 
This is generalized to open terms by taking the universal closure 
where A has free variables xi , . . . ,xk (here p can be arbitrary because &, . . . &,,A is 
closed). 
Let T be a subset of closed assertions in the syntax. Define 
4 ,...,& krA iff for all atomic net valuations N such that 
WET. h/B), kN (B1 63-49~~ --o A). 
Before proceeding with the proof rules we show how the new constructions can be 
used to express liveness. 
A transition t is live iff VM E [A40)3M’ E [M). M’ [t). 
This can be expressed by 
+N $t(Mo - x)&l - (x - ‘t @T)). 
Obviously liveness can then be expressed for finite nets. 
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7.4. Proof rules 
The proof rules are 
definable in the purely 
TFA 
WI I- 4~1 
those of Section 2 (without exponentials - they will become 
propositional logic), together with 
121 
(Subst.) 
where 0 is a substitution of marking terms (i.e. assertions built up from variables, 
atoms and 1 purely by 63) - the usual care to avoid capture of free variables applies 
here. 
r,BtA 
r,$,B tA 
x 4 FVr,A) 
r t A[M/.x] 
rtcELA 
where A4 is a marking term. 
Note that these rules yield (and in the presence of (Subst.) are equivalent with) 
UJQ FA 
r,BtA 
x 4 FV(T, A). (@-adj.) 
As usual, by the double line in the inference rule we understand two rules read in an 
upwards and downwards direction. 
Assume (@k) and (I- @). The upwards direction of the rule (@-adj.) is simply (@+). 
The downwards direction, viz., 
C@,Bt-A 
r,BtA 
x @ Wr,A) 
is derivable in the following way. Clearly, B t B so by application of (I- CB), B I- $, B. 
Now by the cut rule from the assumption r, &B t- A we can conclude T,B F A. 
By using (Subst.) we can also derive (@I-) and (Fe) from (@-adj.). The rule (@I-) 
is simply the upwards reading of (@-adj.). Now we show (k @) follows from (@-adj.): 
Clearly @, A t @, A, from which A F @A follows by (@-adj.); hence by (Subst.) 
A[M/x] E @, A, making (I- CD) derivable: 
r,BtA 
r,&B t A’ 
#-$ x$FV(T). 
x 
Note these rules are equivalent with 
rt_A 
= x$!FV(T). 
rt&A 
t&4.) 
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In addition, we have the following axioms valid of nets: 
(Al~A2)&B~(Al&B)$(AZ&B) (&-@-dist.) 
( > 
@A &B F @(A & B) where x 4 FV(B) (&-@-d&t.) 
X X 
In fact, in the presence of the atomicity, basis and primeness axioms, these distributivity 
laws are derivable from those in the special case where B is 1. The other distributive 
law, 
&(A @B) I- &A @B where x $5 FV(B), 
X ( > x 
is also derivable (for general B). 
t- &B @$((B&l)* F) 
( > 
(Atomicity) 
* X 
These entail sequents of the following form (by taking the variable x to not appear 
in B): 
k B@((B&l) --Q F). 
These hold because in an atomic net the denotation of a formula B & 1, in an environ- 
ment for its free variables, only has two possibilities, to be the denotation of F or the 
denotation of 1: 
Al-@x@((x+A)&l) wherex$FV(A) 
X 
(Basis) 
These hold in an atomic net because an assertion denotes a set of markings; notice 
how the expression (X --o A)&1 is equivalent to 1 in the case the marking x satisfies A 
and F otherwise, so the effect in the whole expression is only to make a contribution 
of x when it satisfies A. 
(x-+B@C) I- (x--oB)@(x+C) 
(x 4 @A) I- @,(x * A) where y and x 
These axioms hold because if a marking is contained 
then it is clearly in a component of the union. 
(Primeness) 
are distinct. 
in union, denoting a disjunction, 
V. Engberg, G. WinskellAnnals of Pure and Applied Logic 86 (1997) 101-135 123 
For clarity we have collected the new proof rules: 
T,BFA 
l-,&B t A 
x 
(A~~Az)&B~(AI&B)~(Az&B) (&-CD-d&.) 
(&-e-d&.) 
(Atomic@) 
A~@x~8((~--4)&1), X$FV(A) 
x 
(Basis) 
(x 4 F) I- F 
(x--oB@C)~(x-oB)$(x-C) 
(X --o @,A) I- $,(x - A) where y and x are distinct 
(Primeness) 
(Subst.) 
(82 k) 
The soundness of the basis and atomicity axioms follows from the fact that, in an 
atomic net, 
[A & lhp = 
1 if 1 ClAl~p F if 1 GI[A]IN~ 
F otherwise 
and IA&l --o F]NP= 
T otherwise. 
We have already remarked that in an atomic net, an exponential !A is represented by 
A & 1. In fact from the atomicity axioms and the rules for exponentials, there is a fairly 
direct proof of their equivalence, yielding 
!A+A&l (4) 
- the syntax of exponentials can be eliminated in favour of the purely propositional 
connectives. 
For the proof first remark that A & 1 I- A and A & 1 k 1, simply by the rules for &_ 
From A& 1 F (A&l)& 1 and (Atom&y) we also get k (A&l)@ (A& 1 - F). Using 
A & 1 I- A & 1 we then deduce 
A & 1 t ((A & I) ~3 (A & I)) @((A & I) @ (A & 1 4 F)) 
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so that A & 1 I- ((A & 1) ~3 (A & 1)) @ F, i.e. 
A&ll-(A&l)@(A&l). 
By (2) of Section 2 this ensures A & 1 I- !A, and clearly !A k A & 1, making (4). 
7.5. Completeness 
Prime theories (made precise in Definition 26) play a key role in showing complete- 
ness. A prime theory arises as the set of all assertions true of some net, and conversely 
from a prime theory we can construct a net whose truths are precisely the prime theory. 
The completeness proof proceeds by showing that if an assertion is not provable then 
there is a prime theory, and so a net, for which it fails to hold. 
In constructing prime theories we follow Henkin and extend the original syntax to 
include new atoms drawn from 
CO,C] )...) C, )... 
a countably infinite enumeration of atoms not already present in the syntax. Suppose 
C is a subset of {ci 1 i E w}. Suppose T,A are assertions from the syntax extended by 
C, and that B is a theory (i.e. a subset of assertions) of the extended syntax. We use 
to mean the sequent is provable in the proof system for the extended syntax, using 
the assertions in 9 as axioms. A judgment r l- A means a sequent is provable in the 
proof system of the original assertion language, without extra atoms. 
Lemma 25. Let B be a closed assertion and F a theory in a syntax extended by 
atoms C c{q 1 i E o}. Then 
r k$ujBl A is T,B & 1 kg A. 
Proof. +-: By induction on the size of derivations of r t&{,) A, considering the 
final rule used. 
+: From tflUjB) B and k 1 follows kFUiB) B&l and so the results from hypothesis 
and cut. 0 
Definition 26. Let C C{ci 1 i E o}. A subset 9 of closed assertions, in the syntax ex- 
tended by atoms C, is called a prime theory iff 
(i) F$S, 
A~@AzE~ =+ AIEF or A~EF, 
@, A E F +- A[M/x] E 9, for some (necessarily closed) marking term M. 
(ii) .3r is deductively closed, i.e. A closed and k$ A + A E 9. 
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Lemma 27 (Existence of prime theories). Let A be an assertion and T a subset of 
closed assertions in the original syntax, for which 
VT A. 
Then, there is a prime theory %, consisting of assertions over the syntax extended 
by some C s{ci 1 i E w}, such that 
TC% and y;A. 
Proof. As the atoms and variables form countable sets we can enumerate all the as- 
sertions 
Ao,A ,,.._, A, ,... 
of the syntax extended by atoms {q 1 i E o}. 
By induction, for n E w, we define a chain of deductively closed theories %n with 
new atoms C,,, such that 
TC%n and yg A. 
Take %s = {B 1 i-T B}. Clearly T G %O and, by assumption, If9O A. Assuming %n is 
deductively closed, includes T, and @ A, define %,,+I according to the following 
cases: 
(i) n is even, and there is an assertion Bt ~3 B2 E %n with Bi q.! %n,B2 $! %“. 
(ii) n is odd, and there is an assertion eXB E %n with B[M/x] q! %n for any closed 
marking terms A4 in the syntax over atoms extended by C,,. 
(iii) Neither (i) nor (ii) applies. 
In case (iii), define C,,+l = C,, and %n+l = 4. 
In case (i), take the earliest assertion in the enumeration B1 @ B2 E %n and B1 $ %* 
and 82 $ %n. As %n is deductively-closed, (B, @ B2) & 1 E %a, so 
(B~&zl)@(Bz&l)~& 
by the &-@-distributivity law. Suppose 
G,B, A and l-g,** A. 
Then, by Lemma 25, 
B1 & 1 kg A and B2 & 1 t-2 A. 
Hence (B, & 1) @ (B2 & 1) kg A. But this implies Fz A, a contradiction. Thus 
Supposing, for instance, b$&, , A, take %,,+I to be {D closed 1 I-!&,, D} and 
C n+l - - c,. 
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In case (ii), take the earliest, according to the enumeration, exB E 4 for which 
B[M/x] $! 4 for all marking terms M, and where x is not a free variable of A. As %n 
is deductively-closed, (a, B) & 1 E Fn, so 
Let c be the first new atom in the list CO, cl,. . . which is not in C,. Define C,+i =C,JJ{c} 
and %n+i to consist of all closed assertions in the deductive closure of 4 U {B[c/x]}, 
i.e. 
We must check that vg:: A. To this end, assume otherwise, that I-~;&, A. Then, by 
Lemma 25, 
B[c/x] & 1 12’ A. 
As c does not appear in C,, or 4, 
To obtain the proof of this sequent, replace all occurrences of the new atom c in the 
proof of B[c/x] & 1 FE+’ A by a new variable - one which does not appear anywhere 
in the proof - and finally use (Subst.) to replace this variable by x using the fact that 
renaming bound variables preserves logical equivalence. But now we can deduce 
But @,(B & 1) E Fn and 4 is deductively closed making tg A, a contradiction. Thus 
fg”:‘, A, as required. 
In this way, we inductively define a chain of theories %n over the syntax extended 
by C,, such that 
with T c %o. Finally, take C = lJ,_,, C, and % = UnEo %” to form the required prime 
theory. 13 
Assume a prime theory % with additional atoms C. Construct a net N from % by 
taking: 
l Places to be the original atoms, including those of C. Atoms are to be interpreted 
as their singleton markings. 
l Transitions as those pairs (M,M’) of multisets of places for which$ t$a’. 
We use JY to represent the set of all markings of the net N. (Note that the markings 
coincide with the closed marking terms of %.) 
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Lemma 28. For markings M,M’ in the net N, 
M+M’ inN isf MtgM’. 
Furthermore, N is atomic. 
Proof. The proof of “iff” is like that for Lemma 9. 
Regarding atomicity of the net, suppose M + Q, for M f A. Then M l-g 1. 
Certainly, 
M@(M&l+ F)E% 
and as % is a prime theory 
MEW or M&~-FEF. 
The case M & 1 4 F E % is impossible. To see this, assume otherwise that M & 1 -O 
FE %. As M k$ 1, and clearly M k M, it follows that M kg M & 1 and hence 
M t-g F. This ensures k$ (M - F) which together with the primeness axiom 
(M+J F)!-F 
yields kg F. I.e. F E % - contradicting % being a prime theory. The case M & 1 --o 
F E % is thus impossible. 
M E 9, where M kg 1. Thus M + 0 in the net. The net N is therefore atomic. 0 
We need the following facts: 
Lemma 29. (i) Let B be an assertion with FV(B) C(x). Let the assertions r not 
include x as a free variable. Then 
(VM E A. r E; B[A4/x]) =+ r k; &B. 
x 
(ii) Let B be an assertion with FV(B)s{xl , . . . ,xk}, and r be assertions in which 
xl,. . . ,Xk are not free. Then 
@MI,... ,Mk E A. r k; B[M&l ,...,&/Xk]) + rt$B. 
Proof. (i) We first prove the special case 
(VM E A. E; A[M/x]) =+ t; &A, 
x 
where FV(A) G(x), by contraposition. By atomicity, 
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where both operands of CD are closed, so as 9 is a prime theory 
Thus supposing b$ &A we obtain tg @,(A & 1 4 F). But as 9 is a prime theory, 
there is then A4 E 4, such that kg (A[A4/x] & 1 4 F) and thus I+!$ A[A4/x]. 
The more general statement of (i) above follows by taking A E @CC --Q B where 
r does not contain x free and B has at most x free. Note r t &B follows from 
+ &x(6X 4 B). 
(ii) follows by induction using (i) together with the fact that &,,B b B. q 
Lemma 30. For assertions r, B and A suppose r, B[M/x] kg A for all M E Jt. As- 
sume FV(B) C(x). Then 
Proof. We show that if B[M/x] k g A for all A4 E JZ where FV(B) Gx, then 
exB kg A. The seemingly stronger esult follows by +-adjunction. 
Assume B[M/x] kg A, for all it4 E 4, and FV(B) C(x). Let some A4 E &Z be given. 
Since FV(B[M/x]) # 0 (A4 is closed) we can use (I-&) to get B[M/x] kg A’ where 
A’ E ,gyE~v(~jA. I.e. FV(A’) = 0 and kg B[M/x] + A’ for all ME .M. By (i) of 
Lemma 29 we then get 
1; &(B --o A’) 
x 
and by logic that 
Here we used the logic deduction 
&(B --o A’) I- B 4 A’ 
x 
holds by (&t) and (identity), 
=+ &(B --o A’),B F A’ 
x 
+ &(B --o A’),@B t-A’ 
x x 
=+ &(B --o A’)k 
x 
by (@I-) as x $! FV 
From kg (@, B) --Q A’ we get @, B t-g A’ and so @, B kg A by (&-adj.). 0 
Now we can relate semantics in the net N to provability in the prime theory 9: 
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Lemma 31. For any assertion A, for any marking environment p, 
lAl,vp = {M E u-h! I M + A[pl}. 
Proof. By structural induction on A. 
AET: [TI,vp=~={M~~~M~~T}. 
A_F:[FI~P=~={ME~IM~~F}-~~F~~~~~(M-~F)~F. 
Azl: [&p={ME&+f -+Q}={ME&IMF~~} byLemma28. 
A-a: ~a~Np={ME~IM +a}={MEdIM~~a} byLemma28. 
A 3 x: I&p = {M E .&z I M -, p(x)} = {M E kf 1~4 kg P(X)) by Lemma 28. 
A=A,@AZ: ForMEd, 
TO show “e” as well, we write A’, E A1 [p] and Ai E Az[p], and use the basic facts 
that 
A’, k @,,w @ ((XI -oA:)&l)andA~~~,,x~~((n~ -Ai)&l). 
Assuming M kg Ai @ Ai, we obtain 
ME; 
( 
&@(@I --4:)&l) 
> ( 
8 @x2@3((x2 -A&%1) 
XI x2 > 
. 
By distributivity of @ over @, 
M k; $&I @ ((xl 4 A’,) & 1) 8x2 @((x2 --o A;) & 1). 
XI x2 
By primeness and because 9 is a prime theory, 
M~MvN(MI -AA:)&~)@MM~@((M~ -A;)&l) 
for some MI, M2 E _dY. 
By atomicity and the fact that 9 is a prime theory 
kg (MI 4 Ai) or kg ((MI +A’,)&1 4 F) 
and 
(*I 
AS M I$ F and M, t$ F for i = 1,2 (by the same argument as in the A = F case 
above) we from (*) deduce (Mi -J A:) & 1 v$ F for i = 1,2, and we must have 
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kg (Ml 4 Ai ) and kg (Mz 4 A;), i.e. A41 kg A:, and A42 kg Ai, as well as 
A4 kg Mi 8 442. This establishes the required reverse implication, and so equivalence. 
A c A, 4 AZ: 
A4 E iAl 4 Advp H I’MI l [Ahp. M + Ml E [A&p. 
H Vh41 ky AI [p]. M ~3 Ml kg Az[p] by induction, 
* VMi EA. M@M @((Ml 4 Al[pl)&l)~~A2b1 
where the last equivalence relies on atomicity and the fact that 9 is a prime theory. 
In more detail, writing A’, E Al [p], Ai z A~[P], we have 
(i) kg Mr --o Ai or (ii)kg(Mr-oA’,)&l-oF 
for any Mi E JT. For case (i), (Mi -A:)&1 -lt$ 1. In case (ii), (Mi -A{)&1 -IF; F. 
It follows, by considering the two cases, that for any M E &?’ 
(Mi k;Ai +M@Ml k;Ai) iff M@Mt@((Mi --o Ai)&l)kgAi. 
Now note that by Lemma 30, 
VA~~EJZ. MG3M~@((A4~~A~)&1)~~A; 
H M@@x, @((xl --o A;)&l))k;A; 
w M@i) kgA{ as Ai -lt$ @.q @((xl - A’,)&l) 
w M k$ A{ 4 Ai i.e. M kg 2, [p] 4 A2[p] as required. 
AEA, @A2: 
MEI[AI @A&p * ME[AI]INP or ME[A~]N~ 
* Mt-gAl[pl orM~~Az[pl 
* ~4 t-g Al [PI @ A2b1, 
where primeness and the fact that 9 is a prime theory is used in showing “+“; the 
other direction “+” follows directly from the proof system. 
A = Al &A2: 
MEI[AI &A&p e- MEI[AI]IN~ andMEfAz]NP 
ti M kg Al [p] and M kg A&] by induction, 
H M k; Albl &AabI- 
H 3M’ E d’. A4 F$ B[p[M’/x]] by induction, 
@ A4 G ClP [PI 
( > x 
where ‘5” follows directly from the proof system, whereas “-+” relies on primeness 
and 9 being a prime theory. 
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H VM’ E k’. M tg B[p[M’/x]] by induction, 
ti Mt-; [p] by (i) of Lemma 29. cl 
Theorem 32 (Completeness). Let A, B and r = B1, . . . , B, be assertions and T con- 
sists of closed assertions in the original syntax. Then 
Proof. As - is present as a constructor on assertions it is clearly sufficient to show 
The “if” direction is shown by induction on the proof of t-T A. To show the “only if” 
direction we prove its contraposition: 
Suppose A is an assertion with free variables x1 , . . . ,Xk. Suppose yr A. Then there is 
a prime theory F > T over additional constants C such that b$ A. Let N be the net 
constructed from 9; let & be the set consisting of its markings. As we now show, 
F;N A. Suppose otherwise, that F=N A. Recall 
fA]~p = {M E &?I M kg A[p]} 
by Lemma 3 1. Hence as +=N A means 0 E [A]IN~ for all environments p, we see 
t$ A[p] for all environments p. 
Therefore ‘g A[Ml/xl, . . . ,Mx_/x~] for all M 1,. . . ,Mk E .4i’. Hence by (ii) of Lemma 29, 
1; A, a contradiction. Thus N is an atomic net satisfying all axioms of the theory T 
and yet kN A. Hence pr A, as required. 0 
Remark. An alternative complete proof system with respect to countable atomic nets 
can be obtained by adding a countably infinite disjunction and infhritary rules for 
reasoning about it. More precisely, as the syntax of assertions take 
A::=TIFIlIaIAl~A2IA1~A2IA1&A2I~A,, 
iEl 
where a ranges over a countable set of atoms and I over countable indexing sets drawn 
from o (this avoids our syntax becoming a proper class). The semantics of assertions 
in an atomic net N is like that earlier in Section 5, with the additional assumption 
that every place is named by an atomic proposition (this assumption ensures that we 
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can describe all markings within the logic of assertions). The semantics of countable 
disjunctions $iErA, is a slight extension of that in the finite case: 
a@A,lN = UL4ilN 
IEI iEI 
All other semantic clauses are the same as in Section 5. As proof rules we take those 
of earlier, in Section 2, but replacing the rules for binary @ by the following two proof 
rules, the second of which is infinitary: 
In addition to these logical rules we also have rules specific to atomic nets: 
(@i&i) &B k @iEr (4 &B) 
k B$(B&l -F) 
where M E ~4’. Here J%’ denotes the set of finite multisets of atoms. As earlier, in 
the context of A assertions, we make the identification with such multisets and tensor 
formulae. Note that _,M is countable as the set of atoms is assumed countable. Note, 
for instance, that the last rule amounts to 
(M 4 F)kF forMEd, 
when the indexing set I is empty. 
8. Decidability issues 
Here we show that the question of whether an assertion from the logic of Section 7 
belongs to the theory of a net is undecidable. We use the following proposition. 
Proposition 33. In the logic of Section 7, we define the following: 
(xl4 =@NA&l)c3xl 
x 
for an assertion A and variable x. Its denotation with respect o a net valuation N 
and environment p is given by 
Theorem 34. The property t===~ A is undecidable for a jinite net N and assertion A 
of the logic of Section 7 (assumed to have infinitely many atomic propositions). 
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Proof. From Rabin’s work (described in [8]), we know that the question of whether 
the reachable markings of one finite net are included in the reachable markings of 
another is undecidable. More precisely, for two finite nets Ni and N2, over the same 
set of places, with markings Mi ,M2, it is undecidable whether or not all the markings 
reachable from Mi in Ni are included in those reachable from M2 in N2. If /=N A 
were decidable we could decide Rabin’s problem. From Ni, N2 we effectively construct 
another net N as follows: Its places are those in common to Ni and N2 plus two 
additional, distinct places ai and ~22. Its transitions are obtained as a disjoint union 
of those of Ni and N2; we adjoin al (with multiplicity 1) to the pre and post places 
of transitions originally is Ni and a2 to the pre and post places of those transitions 
originally of N2: . 
t1 If? a1 . a2 
. +x t2 .*.. 
where tl is a transition of Ni and t2 is a transition of N2. 
Now, using Proposition 33, we could decide Rabin’s problem if we could decide 
+=N (xI”(Mz@Jaz 4 x@a2)) - (xI”(M @al 4 Xc?JUl)) 
Hence the property FN A is undecidable. 0 
This undecidability result accompanies a fundamental difficulty in using the logic, 
especially to establish negative properties of individual nets. The difficulty is in knowing 
which part of theory of an individual net to be assumed in proving properties of the 
net. Indeed we cannot see how the logic might be used to prove the mutual exclusion 
property required of Example 5. 
Although we feel sure the logic of Section 7 is undecidable, i.e. k A is not decidable 
for general A, we presently lack a proof (unfortunately, the techniques of [lo] do 
not work directly because of our primeness axioms). There remain, in addition, the 
questions of decidability and complexity of weaker fragments of the logic than those 
of Section 7 and their theories with respect to a specified finite net. However, directly 
from [lo], it is known that the @-free and -o-free fragments (without the law of 
&-@distributivity) of Section 6 are decidable. 
9. Conclusions 
Two questions emerge in our work: 
(i) What can Petri nets contribute to linear logic? 
(ii) What can linear logic contribute to Petri nets? 
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The expressiveness and completeness results that follow give answers to (i). For the 
@-free fragment of linear logic (its syntax is given in Section 6), Petri nets are a good 
model; they give a sound and complete interpretation of this fragment of the logic 
without having to add any extra axioms or rules. For the other parts of linear logic 
that we treat, the answer must be more qualified, because we need to adjoin extra 
axioms to obtain completeness. Addressing (i), we hope the reader comes to share 
our view that Petri nets (with our semantics) are a helpful, intuitive and convincing 
model of linear logic - certainly Petri nets carry their own intuition and are models of 
interest, independently of linear logic. 
A definitive answer to (ii) is impossible at present. Linear logic is one of the few 
logics for Petri nets which treat in a non-artificial way the fact that places can hold 
with multiplicities. The modest logics of Section 6 enable us to prove basic positive 
assertions about individual nets starting from facts about basic transitions. The logic 
of Section 7 is much more expressive, enabling us to capture a good many negative 
properties, and we have a complete proof system. But unfortunately we pay for its 
strength through the theory of a finite net being non-recursive. This undecidability 
exhibits a serious problem with using the logic to reason about individual nets; in fact, 
as remarked, for even a simple net like that of Example 5 we cannot see how to use 
the logic to prove mutual exclusion. 
The last disappointment may point the way to an expressive logic in which finite 
nets have recursive theories. One way is to restrict the model, and the most promising 
candidate would seem to be nets where each place has a finite capacity. Difficulties with 
generalising the semantics of Section 5 (associated with sums of multisets sometimes 
being disallowed because capacities are exceeded) have led us to narrow attention to 
safe nets, for which the capacities are never exceeded with respect to a chosen initial 
marking. The hope is that we can maintain expressiveness and completeness but this 
time with a decidable and more workable relation of satisfaction. 
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